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| **Construct** | **Definition** | **Study 1** | **Study 2** | **Study 3** | **Measure** | **Timing of Assessment** | **Reference** |
| Utilitarianism | Morality of actions depend on consequences | X |  | X | Ethical Standards of Judgement Questionnaire Utilitarian Subscale: 6 item, 5-point likert scale, scored as an average | Baseline | Love et al., 2018 |
| Deontology | Morality of actions depend on the intrinsic nature of the action | X |  | X | Ethical Standards of Judgement Questionnaire Deontology Subscale (6 item, 5-point likert scale, scored as an average) | Baseline | Love et al., 2018 |
| Social Consensus | The degree of social agreement that an action is ‘evil’ or ‘good’ | X | X | X | “Estimation and Reveal” exercise: Subjects estimate recent levels of social consensus on issues, receive feedback on ‘actual’ consensus as an artificial anchor, and finally estimate current levels of social consensus | Pre and Post Intervention | Kobayashi, 2018 |
| Moral Conviction | Perception that a belief is *universal*  and *objective*) |  | X | X | Single Item Moral Conviction Screener: “My feelings about ‘X’ are a reflection of my core moral beliefs and convictions”; 0 (Strongly disagree) to 100 (Strongly agree) | Pre and Post Intervention | Skitka et al., 2005 |

HOW DOES MORAL CONVICTION DIFFER FROM STRENGTH OF BELIEF????

Ancillary Work for Coverage: Moral Conviction Measurement

Skitka 2005:

* ‘Attitudes held with strong moral conviction (*moral mandates*) were predicted to have different interpersonal consequences than STRONG but NONMORAL attitudes
  + After controlling for attitude strength directly, there was a unique effect of moral conviction
    - Increase in social and physical distance from those who have different moral convictions.
  + Stronger moral conviction lead to:
    - Greater preferred social/physical distance from those w/ different moral convictions
    - Intolerance of different moral conviction in intimate and distant relationships
    - Lower levels of good will/cooperation for those with different attitudes.
    - Increased difficulty to find solutions to disagreements
* How are moral convicted attitudes different from strong nonmoral attitudes?
  + Several parts of attitude strength are presumed to measure the same latent construct. But there are only low/moderate positive correlations amongst the following items!
  + Each element here is seen as distinct contributors to the ‘strength’ of an attitude
    - Attitude ‘extremity’ is the extent to which an attitude deviations from neutrality
    - Attitudes ‘importance’ is subjective significance people attach to an attitudes
    - Attitude ‘certainty’ is degree that people feel SURE about their position on an issue
    - Attitude ‘centrality’ is how much of an attitude is entangled with a persons’ sense of identity/how interconnected it is with other attitudes/beliefs.
  + Strong attitudes are “durable over time”/resisitant to change, and impact judgement/behavior.
* Is moral conviction just another contributor to attitude strength, or fundamentally different?
  + Adding assessments of moral oblivgation increases attitude-behavior correspondence!
  + Moral based opposition to various policies is also an important predictor of political activism. For example, moral opposition to the nuclear bomb emerged as a discriminator of those who did versus did not actively campaign for political candidates who took a stand on this issue, trumping other possible predictors like fear or having activist friends
  + In a related vein, persuasive messages that activated concerns with people’s sense of moral self led to higher levels of donating blood than did exposure to a fear appeal, a combined moral and fear appeal message, or no message
    - Each of these relatively isolated examples is consistent with the prediction that attitudes based on moral convictions may have higher action potentials than attitudes that reflect nonmoral tastes, preferences, or social conventions, however strong these may be.
* Definition of “Moral Conviction” (defined in skitka 2002, and skitka and mullen 2002b??)
* Universalism:
  + If one says, ‘I value gender equality, but others need not value gender equality,’ then gender equality is a matter of personal taste. If one says, ‘We in our culture value gender equality, but people in other cultures need not value gender equality,’ then one is treating gender equality as a social convention. However, if one sees gender equality as a moral good or a moral truth, then one is committed to saying, ‘I value gender equality, and everyone else should too, even in other cultures.’ (Haidt, Rosenberg, and Hom, 2003)
  + Universality is seen as a distinguishing feature that separates moral from nonmoral beliefs?
  + These attitudes are seen as ones that transcend boundaries of persons/cultures
  + Preferences, conventions, and morals, are seen as psychologically distinct (Turiel, 1983)
    - People ‘experience’ their moral convictions as beliefs that everyone would or could be persuaded to share, in part, because moral convictions are experienced as matters of fact, rat her than preference, taste, or conviction.
* Moral Conviction as experiences of Fact:
  + Distinguishes moral convictions from otherwise strong and nonmoral attitudes, these are seen as facts about the world.
  + “Good and bad” are experienced as objective characteristics, not just verbal labels attached to feelings (Shweder, 2002)
  + Moral conviction results in experiences of facts as ‘motivational guides’, e.g. water is two hydrogen and one oxygen (fact), but this does not inspire action, however, the ‘fact’ that voluntarily terminating a pregnancy is fundamentally wrong, carries within it an inherent motivational quality (e.g., an ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’) that motivates behavior.
  + Thus, moral convictions, unlike strong but nonmoral attitudes, are experienced as a unique combination of factual belief, compelling motive, and justification for action.
* Study here directly tested the universality and impact predictions of moral mandate hypothesis.
  + Moral conviction was assessed with “How much are your feelings about \_\_\_\_\_\_ connected to your core moral beliefs or convictions?”
    - Universality prediction tested: 1st – Indices of attitude strength would correlate more strongly with preferred social distance in intimate vs distant relationships, but moral conviction would be equally associated with social distance in both close and distant relationships. 2nd – test whether preferred social distance from an attitudinally dissimilar other would be invariant across the degree of intimacy of the relationship when moral conviction was high.
    - E.g. For those who hold a position with low moral conviction, they reject those with dissimilar attitudes more strongly in intimate relationships, instead of in distant relationships, HOWEVER, those who hold a position with high moral conviction, reject dissimilar attitudes equally in close and distant relationships.
  + Participants rejected those who did not share their moral beliefs, irrespective of whether the relationship was intimate or distant, when moral conviction was high. Participants were more tolerant of dissimilar beliefs, and even more so in distant relationships, when moral conviction was low.

Skitka 2002: “The Dark Side” of Moral Conviction

* Moral conviction forms the foundtation for ‘strong morally vested attitudes’, and that these beliefs have strong ‘action potentials’ as compared to other strong beliefs, because they are seen as ‘oughts and shoulds’.
* Morality = notions of right and wrong and Conviction = unshakable belief in something without needing proof or evidence
  + Thus, moral conviction is “A strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral”
* Moral mandates share the characteristics of other strong attitudes (extremity, importance, certainty) but have an ADDED motivational and action component, BECAUSE they are imbued with moral conviction

Skitka and Mullen 2002: Understanding Judgments of Fairness in a Real-World Political Context: A Test of the Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning

* Moral Mandates are important determinants of how people reason about fairness.
  + Strength of moral mandates were predictive of outcomes, NOT pre-raid judgements of procedural fairness!
* “Moral conviction refers to a strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral”
  + Some convictions are the result of deliberate reasoning and subsequence accepting of a moral precept, but they do not often require reasoning or evidence!
  + “moral conviction is hypothesized to be experienced as psychologically nonnegotiable and as a fundamental truth about right and wrong”
* Moral conviction is not seen to exist in every behavior/thought in all contexts!
  + Moral mandates are hypothesized to be a selective self-expressive stand on a specific issue, not a generalization towards the world.
  + Moral mandates are seen as a ‘special class’ of strong attitudes. All moral mandates are examples of strong attitudes, not all strong attitudes are moral mandates.
* “Recent research supports the notion that moral conviction has unique explanatory power above and beyond traditional indices of attitude strength.”
  + Preference for presidents in the 2000 election was connected to core moral values and convictions, even after controlling for other indices of attitude strength and party identification.
* Moral Mandates/Convictions were directly tested by asking the extent to which there was an outcome-based moral mandate.
  + Explicit moral framing asked - “Regardless of what the law says about it, the only moral solution in this case is X and Y” vs “Regardless of what the law says about it,The only moral solution in this case is NOT X and Y”
* After controlling for attitude importance, the effect of moral mandate was still effective and mattered.
  + These results provide discriminant validity that the index of moral mandate is NOT the same as attitude strength.
* Moral mandates predicted willingness to consider alternative outcomes, and associated with commitment to one dominant value.
  + People WITHOUT a moral mandate in either direction, were more flexible about the possibility of there being more than one right outcome, and had equal levels of commitment/conflict between all competing values.
  + People with moral mandates were more likely than those without to both critize the government and other parties in the case, and reaffirm their commitments to the moral convictions when given an open-ended opportunity to do so.

Skitka 2002b: Do the Means Always Justify the Ends, or Do the Ends Sometimes Justify the Means? A Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning

* Hypothesis 1: Moral mandate doesn’t affect perception of fairness when there is no threat to the mandate, but less fairness will be perceived when the there is a threat.
* Hypothesis 2: Impact of fairness on outcome judgements will be eliminated (interaction) when people have a strong moral mandate. Decisions made in a morally mandated context, the outcome judgements are determined by strength of moral mandate. “When one has a moral mandate, any means will justify the end”
* Operationalizing moral mandate: Defined as participants’ attitude position within each domain, weighted by the moral importance they attach to the position.
  + Attitude extremity and direction were tapped with 3 items measured in bipolar 7 point scales.
  + Average importance score was multiplied by extremity score to yield moral mandate measure
    - Ranged from “Strongly against change and morally important” to “strongly for change, and morally important”.